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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
UNinom RuLEs OF EvIDENcE § 26, which maintains that the privi-
lege should be protected if the communication is overheard in a
manner not reasonably to be anticipated by the client.
The argument presented thus far would seem to place the at-
torney-client communication beyond the reach of the law; however,
this is not the case. Aside from the client's waiver of the privilege
it may be destroyed on other grounds. For an excellent theoretical
discussion see Mr. Justice Cardozo's opinion in Clark v. United
States, 289 U.S. 1, 13 (1933). The privilege may be destroyed
where there is a substantial showing that legal aid was sought for
the perpetration of future crime or fraud. See In re Selser, 15 N.J.
Super. 393, 105 A.2d 895 (1954); cf. State v. Childers, 196 La. 554,
199 So. 640 (1940). Thus, in the principal case the legislative com-
mittee was not without a means of exposing the communication, had
they been able to establish a right to abrogate the privilege under
this principle.
It is submitted that the court in the principal case permitted
the legislative committee to impinge on the civil liberties of an indi-
vidual by disposing of an essential privilege through the application
of finely drawn distinctions which have no justification in reason
or principle. Although the attorney-client privilege has no express
guarantee in the Constitution, and is basically an expression of
policy, it is indispensable to the administration of justice and should
not be dealt with in a capricious manner.
J. O. F.
TAXAT oN-DEFERnED COMPENSAnON PLAN FOR CoNouaLNc
STOCKHOLDER.-A corporation, engaged in the manufacture of cloth-
ing, entered into a deferred compensation agreement with its presi-
dent and majority stockholder (98 of 100 shares), the taxpayer. To
fund the agreement the corporation purchased a combined life
and annuity contract insuring his life, whereby taxpayer was to
receive a monthly payment for life as a pension, and the corpora-
tion was declared owner and beneficiary of the policy. The Tax
Court, in affirming the Commissioner's determination, held the
annual premiums paid by the corporation to be a taxable dividend
to taxpayer, the transaction lacking bona fides and being merely
an attempt to use corporate funds without taxation. Held, that
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the taxpayer had no legal interest in the policy and received no
immediate personal benefit from the corporate purchase of the
policy; therefore, not taxable. Reversed. Casale v. Commissioner,
247 F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1957).
Deferred compensation plans have often been involved in tax
litigation, see, e.g., Wolfe v. Commissioner, 170 F.2d 73 (9th Cir.
1948); Richard R. Deupree, 1 T.C. 113 (1942); but in the principal
case we have the added factor of the controlling stockholder in-
volved.
Simply speaking, a deferred compensation is any delayed pay-
ment for services. A clearer understanding of a typical deferred
compensation plan may be gained from the following example:
"As additional compensation for services to be rendered in 1957,
employer promises to pay employee or his estate $10,000 in $1,000
annual installments commencing on the first day of the year fol-
lowing his sixty-fifth birthday." Lefevre, Deferred Compensation
Plans, N.Y.U. 15th INsT. oN FED. TAx. 1081 (1957). To finance such
a plan, an insurance policy is usually purchased by the corpora-
tion, and whether payments on this policy create a present benefit
to the employee is the issue in the present case.
From the decision of the principal case, three factors appear
which should be considered in determining the taxability of the
stockholder in deferred compensation plans of this sort.
First, that a corporation is an entity separate and distinct
from its stockholders is a well-settled principle of law. Kanawha-
Roane Lands v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 631 (S.D.W. Va.
1955); Commonwealth Title Co. v. Rothensies, 124 F. Supp. 274
(E.D. Pa. 1954); Jeffries v. Commissioner, 158 F.2d 225 (5th Cir.
1927).
The lower court, in adding up (1) the similarity between the
compensation agreement and the policy issued, (2) the fact that
the taxpayer owned 98% of the corporate stock, and (3) the right
of the taxpayer to change beneficiaries, arrived at the conclusion
that the transaction was a sham, and that the corporation was no
more than a conduit running from the insurer to the taxpayer.
While it is agreed that the taxpayer controls the corporation, the
court in the instant case rightly refused to allow a further conclu-
sion that the taxpayer is the corporation. The Supreme Court has
recognized an exception to this principle; the corporate form may
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be disregarded when it is a sham or unreal. Moline Properties v.
Commissioner, 319 U.S. 486 (1943); Gregory v. Helvering, 293
U.S. 465 (1935). But in the instant case, the corporation has been
formed for a definite purpose and a legitimate business.
A second factor to be considered is the element of control
over the insurance contract, and in connection with this, the third
factor of the benefit of the policy must also be discussed.
Although the corporation was named owner of the policy, the
Commissioner points out that the taxpayer retained the right to
change the beneficiary under the agreement, thus asserting con-
trol of the plan. However, all incidents of ownership end here.
The policy was a corporate asset; the corporation paid premiums,
had the right to assign and the right to receive dividends, and
could borrow on the policy.
To emphasize the fact that the corporation had control of the
policy, it is important to realize the possibility that creditors of the
corporation could reach the cash value of the policy, just as they
can reach all corporate assets. Cf. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v.
Scales, 62 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1933). Therefore, insolvency of the
corporation could destroy the seemingly definite benefit to the
taxpayer.
It is important to remember that under a deferred compensa-
tion plan of this sort, the insurance may be used to pay the com-
pensation benefits, but such benefits may be paid from some other
asset, and in the same sense, the policy might be used for some
other corporate use.
In light of the foregoing, the following conclusions seem
plausible from the court's decision:
(1) The corporate entity will be recognized, notwithstanding
the fact that the corporation is controlled by one or more majority
stockholders, unless a sham is definitely proved.
(2) The control and benefits of a policy in a deferred com-
pensation plan must be retained solely by the corporation. A slight
incident of ownership by the taxpayer or control by a third party,
destroying the possibility of corporate creditors reaching the policy,
may defeat the corporate control argument.
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(3) Any element of control of the policy in the hands of the
taxpayer or noncontrol by the corporation may give rise to an
immediate taxable benefit to the taxpayer.
The decision in the principal case has received a boost by a
subsequent First Circuit holding under a somewhat similar factual
situation. Prunier v. Commissioner, 5 CCH 1957 Stand. Fed. Tax
Rep. (57-2 U.S.T.C.) ff 10,015 (1st Cir. Nov. 8, 1957). The court
regarded as a settled ruling "that where a corporation is the bene-
ficiary and owner of a policy of insurance on the life of an
employee or stockholder, the payment of premiums by the cor-
poration does not constitute income to the insured individual," and
cites the principal case as authority. Prunier v. Commissioner,
supra at 58,548. However, Sanders v. Fox, 149 F. Supp. 942 (D.C.
Utah 1957), remains contra to the principal case.
The recent decisions in the Casale and Prunier cases seem to
indicate a trend of the circuits; where the corporation owns, con-
trols, and benefits from the policy involved, there is no immediate
taxable benefit to the stockholder concerned.
J. S. T.
LEGISLATION
COIpOTmNs-EEcr OF PnoPosE STOCK VOTING AmENDMEN7
ON OTSTANmNG SToc.-West Virginia voters in the 1958 general
election will be asked to approve an amendment to the state con-
stitution requiring the legislature to provide by law that every
corporation shall have the power to issue one or more classes of
stock with full, limited or no voting rights, and that holders of
voting shares may vote them cumulatively for directors. W. Va.
Acts 1957, c. 18, § 1. This amendment would replace the present
provision that the legislature shall provide by law that every stock-
holder shall have the right to vote the number of shares owned
by him cumulatively for directors. W. VA. CoNsT. art. X, § 4.
In executing this constitutional requirement, the legislature
provided that stockholders could cumulate shares entitled to vote.
W. VA. CODE c. 31, art. 1, § 66 (Michie 1955). It also empowered
corporations to issue stock with full, limited or no voting power.
W. VA. CODE c. 31, art. 1, § 22 (Michie 1955). The possible un-
constitutionality of these statutes had long been recognized. Note,
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